Verified events
Ivan and Foma – pseudonyms used for safety – appear in a BBC World Service documentary produced by Polish journalist Marcin Mamon. Both men say they are employed by Ukraine’s military intelligence service (GUR) and are opposed to President Vladimir Putin’s regime.
Ivan describes his role in preparing Ukrainian drone attacks on strategic bombers and munitions factories inside Russia. He says he helped locate sites to hide drone components and once filmed himself placing explosives near a Russian military airfield. The documentary includes a video he sent showing the alleged placement of explosives.
Foma, a Russian exile living in Poland, runs a remote network of volunteers inside Russia. He teaches them how to surveil senior military officers, providing files with photos, personal data, and vehicle details. According to Foma, his network consists of “three dozen” people spread across Russia, Ukraine and other parts of Europe, with external members handling logistical tasks such as tracking digital footprints.
The GUR has confirmed that both men work for the agency, while also noting that it cannot verify the full extent of their activities. The Ukrainian authorities have publicly acknowledged a strategy of coordinated drone attacks on what they call “legitimate targets” inside Russia and the use of secret agents to support these operations.
One concrete target mentioned is Lt Gen Fanil Sarvarov, who was assassinated in Moscow in December 2025 by an explosive device hidden under his car. Foma admits he supplied intelligence on Sarvarov to the Ukrainians, though he stresses his network does not carry out assassinations themselves.
Scope and methods
The men claim that Russian sabotage groups number between 300 and 500 individuals, though this figure cannot be independently verified. Their tactics include:
- Surveilling high‑level officers identified by GUR for potential targeting.
- Training volunteers online to trail and document movements of selected officials.
- Providing intelligence that may enable drone strikes or other covert actions.
- Avoiding direct involvement in attacks to reduce legal exposure; participants would face terrorism charges if caught.
Both men emphasize operational secrecy: they avoid group chats, limit digital footprints, and travel to third countries (e.g., Georgia) to meet handlers and discuss plans.
Uncertainties and limits of verification
While the documentary offers rare first‑hand accounts, many details remain unconfirmed. GUR itself admits it cannot fully map the network or verify every claim made by Ivan and Foma. Their handlers express doubt about the reliability of any individual operative, including Ivan, who was told, “I’m not sure of anyone, except myself.”
Independent verification of specific attacks is difficult. For example, the source mentions a possible strike on Russia’s largest military drone factory in Yelabuga in June 2024, but no external reports confirm the outcome beyond a single reported fatality.
Furthermore, the exact number of Russian collaborators remains speculative. Foma’s estimate of 300‑500 participants and his “three dozen” core network lack external corroboration, and the BBC notes that many such individuals may be unaware of their involvement or are motivated by payment rather than ideology.
Finally, the broader political context adds ambiguity. Ukraine officially denies responsibility for targeted killings, even as a Ukrainian intelligence officer previously admitted involvement in the December 2024 assassination of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov. This policy of plausible deniability makes it hard to attribute specific actions to Ukrainian or Russian actors with certainty.
Implications
These testimonies suggest a shadowy layer of resistance within Russia, coordinated with Ukrainian intelligence, that seeks to undermine the military capabilities supporting the war in Ukraine. If the described network operates as claimed, it could represent a significant, albeit covert, pressure point against the Putin regime, especially as the war drags on and internal dissent grows.
However, the lack of verifiable evidence means that the true impact of these sabotage efforts remains uncertain. For policymakers and observers, the accounts highlight the need for careful intelligence assessment and the challenges of measuring clandestine activities that operate across borders and under layers of secrecy.
